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How do we understand the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of delayed marriage due to illness versus rabbinical decree? The shiur develops two distinct approaches: illness as true onas (exempting circumstance) versus rabbinical extension of the obligation's timeframe. This distinction affects when a husband becomes obligated in spousal support.
This shiur analyzes Kesubos 2a, focusing on a fundamental machlokes between two interpretations (lishnos) in the Gemara (גמרא) regarding delayed marriage obligations. The central issue involves understanding why certain circumstances exempt a man from providing mezonos (spousal support) when marriage is delayed. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Maharsha's position that distinguishes between delays "for his sake" versus "for her sake." The Maharsha argues that when a rabbinical decree (takanas chachamim) delays marriage for the groom's benefit, he remains obligated in mezonos because he's not truly an onas (in exempting circumstances). However, when the delay benefits the bride, such as with the three-day preparation period, he's exempt from mezonos. Rabbi Zweig raises difficulties with this approach, noting that the Gemara's language ("lefikach chalah") suggests the opposite of the Maharsha's reading.
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Kesubos 2a
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