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Why does the Rav Sadigora use the word "misa" when describing eid zomem, and what does "le'docro" mean? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: dinei nefashos requires witnesses you can actually punish (nefesh be'nefesh), while dinei mamonos only requires the ability to prove they're plotting. This resolves Tosfos's famous question about why malkos can serve as a fulfillment of ka'asher zamam.
The shiur opens with an analysis of the Rav Sadigora's piyyutim (liturgical poems), particularly examining why one poem on the Aseres Hadibros mentions "misa" (death) in connection with eid zomem, while another poem omits this term. Rabbi Zweig also questions the unusual phrase "le'docro" in describing how the witness intended to kill. The discussion centers on a fundamental machloques regarding eidim she'eino yachol lahazim (witnesses whom you cannot render zomemim). The Shach strongly rejects certain poskim who claim that dinei mamonos doesn't require eidim she'ata yachol lahazim, bringing multiple proofs including the Gemara (גמרא) in Bava Kamma, explicit statements in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Malveh v'Loveh, and other sources that clearly require this standard even for monetary cases.
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Makkos 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
