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Why is marriage delayed for her sake considered an ones, but not for his? The shiur develops a chiddush that when obstacles to marriage arise for her benefit (like preparing for shechta), it creates a legitimate ones status. When delays are for his needs (like tanis besulim), he should have married earlier and bears responsibility.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 2a regarding the halachos of marriage timing and the concept of ones (circumstances beyond one's control). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining why the Mishna phrases the law as "besulah nisus" (a virgin gets married) rather than "nisus besulah" (marrying a virgin), suggesting this indicates the halacha (הלכה) is structured around her needs rather than his obligations. The core analysis centers on understanding when someone is considered an ones regarding marriage timing. The Gemara discusses a case where the time for marriage (higiyah zman) arrives but various circumstances prevent the wedding. Rabbi Zweig cites the Maharsha's fundamental principle: if the delay is for her sake (such as the three-day preparation period of shechta), the husband is considered an ones and is exempt from the obligation to provide mezanos (financial support). However, if the delay is for his sake (such as needing tanis besulim to verify her virginity), he is not considered an ones because he should have anticipated this need and married earlier.
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Kesubos 2a
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