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What is the nature of the heter for melacha on Yom Tov? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds that all melachos remain forbidden - even cooking is fundamentally an issur. The Torah (תורה) provides a specific heter of ochel nefesh which permits certain melachos when done for food preparation, but this doesn't eliminate their essential character as forbidden work.
The shiur presents an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya from Kesubos 7a dealing with the principle of "mitoch" - the concept that since certain melachos are permitted on Yom Tov for food preparation (l'tzorech ochel nefesh), they become permitted even when not done for food needs (shelo l'tzorech). Rabbi Zweig examines several fundamental questions raised by the Rishonim on this Gemara (גמרא). The Rosh raises two primary difficulties with Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation. First, if the principle of mitoch allows any melacha to be done even shelo l'tzorech, then cooking for tomorrow should be completely permissible rather than merely exempt from malkos. Second, why does the Gemara require that a melacha be "shaveh l'chol nefesh" (equally needed by all) if even unnecessary melachos are permitted through mitoch?
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Kesubos 7a
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