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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) in Pesachim 114b use a complex case to derive that mitzvos tzrichos kavanah when simpler examples exist? The shiur resolves an apparent contradiction in the Rambam (רמב"ם) by distinguishing between kavanah for fulfillment versus kavanah for proper ma'aseh hamitzvah. When one action could serve multiple mitzvos, intention directs which mitzvah (מצוה) the act accomplishes.
This shiur presents a profound analysis of the sugya of mitzvos tzrichos kavanah found in Pesachim 114b. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where one uses the same vegetable (chazereth) for both karpas and maror, and Reish Lakish derives from this that mitzvos tzrichos kavanah - mitzvos require intention. However, Rabbi Zweig questions why this complex case is used to establish such a fundamental principle when simpler cases exist. The shiur then examines an apparent contradiction in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings. In Hilchos Chametz U'Matzah, the Rambam states that one who eats matzah without proper intention still fulfills the obligation, suggesting mitzvos ain tzrichos kavanah. Yet in Hilchos Rosh Hashanah, he clearly requires intention for shofar, stating that both the listener and the one blowing must have proper kavanah. The Rishonim offer various resolutions, with the Magid Mishna distinguishing between ma'aseh mitzvos (action-based) and non-ma'aseh mitzvos.
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Pesachim 114b
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