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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) classify both types of zorek (throwing) — between domains and within reshus harabim — as subcategories of hotzaah rather than maavor arba amos? The shiur demonstrates that both involve makom changes, sharing hotzaah's essential spatial-transfer characteristic. This classification affects practical requirements like hanachah al da'as for Shabbos (שבת) liability.
This shiur examines a fundamental issue in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s classification of Shabbos (שבת) melachos, specifically focusing on the nature of zorek (throwing). The discussion begins with analyzing why the Rambam brings different pesukim in Hilchos Shabbos versus Hilchos Shegagos regarding carrying on Shabbos. In Hilchos Shabbos, the Rambam cites the pasuk from Parshas Vayakhel, while in Hilchos Shegagos he brings the pasuk from Parshas Beshalach. Rabbi Zweig explains that this difference relates to whether the prohibition is explicit in the Torah (תורה) (psuto shel mikra) or requires rabbinic interpretation (geziras hakasuv). For Hilchos Shegagos, which deals with inadvertent violations where beis din must issue a ruling, the prohibition must be clearly stated in the Torah text itself. The pasuk regarding carrying requires geziras hakasuv to establish the prohibition, making it unsuitable for the context of shegagos where the prohibition must be self-evident. The shiur then transitions to examining the Rambam's position on zorek (throwing). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether zorek daled amos (throwing four cubits) in reshus harabim is a subcategory of hotzaah (carrying out) or maavor arba amos (transferring four cubits). The Rambam's formulation suggests that both types of zorek - throwing from one domain to another and throwing within reshus harabim - are subcategories of hotzaah rather than maavor. This represents a significant chidush, as it would seem logical that throwing within the same domain would be classified under maavor arba amos.
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Shabbos 2a
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