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When Chazal say "kol hamekadesh al das rabbanan mekadesh" - that all kiddushin are subject to rabbinic approval - what are the mechanics and limits of this principle? The shiur analyzes how the Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes between kiddushin with money (where rabbanan can declare the money hefker) versus kiddushin with biah, exploring whether rabbinic authority extends to creating issurei biah.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא)'s principle "kol hamekadesh al das rabbanan mekadesh" and the related concept of "afkiru rabbanan kiddushin minei." Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Chasam Sofer's approach to understanding the distinction between cases of "im lo bosi" (if I don't come) and "im bosi" (if I come) in conditional kiddushin, particularly regarding whether the principle of "ones rachmana patrei" (the Torah (תורה) exempts cases of duress) applies to kiddushin as it does to gittin. The discussion then turns to Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation of how the rabbinic power works. When the Gemara asks why kiddushin with money can be annulled but questions arise regarding kiddushin with biah, Rashi explains that with money, the rabbanan can make the money "maamad matanah" - as if it were given as a gift rather than for kiddushin. This removes the woman's obligation to reciprocate, making the transaction a kinyan kesef ineffective. Rabbi Zweig analyzes what "maamad matanah" means mechanically - not that they change the giver's intent, but that they remove the recipient's obligation to give something in return, making it effectively a gift.
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Kesubos 2b-3a
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