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Can someone lend money for ten years knowing shemitah will cancel the debt? The shiur analyzes whether this creates a tanai (condition) to avoid shemitah or constitutes matana (a gift). The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach that shemitah automatically discharges debt makes tanai impossible, requiring the repayment to be structured as matana.
This shiur examines a fundamental question in the laws of shemitah: when someone lends money for ten years, knowing that the sabbatical year will intervene and cancel the debt, what is the halachic nature of this transaction? The Tosafot raise a critical difficulty - if the lender clearly doesn't intend to give a gift (matana), it must be a conditional loan (tanai) that 'you should not cause me to lose through shemitah' (al menash lo tishmiteni bi-shvis). The shiur explores two fundamentally different approaches to understanding shemitah. One view holds that shemitah works through the prohibition 'lo yigos' (you shall not collect) - the lender has no right to collect during the sabbatical year, but the underlying debt remains until formally discharged. The alternative approach, championed by the Rambam (רמב"ם), maintains that shemitah automatically discharges the debt entirely - there is no underlying obligation remaining. According to the Rambam's position, it becomes impossible to make a tanai regarding shemitah because one cannot resurrect a debt that the Torah (תורה) has automatically cancelled. This leads to the conclusion that when someone lends for ten years, knowing shemitah will intervene, the eventual repayment must be classified as matana rather than fulfillment of the original debt obligation. The shiur analyzes how this resolves the Tosafot's question while creating new implications. If the repayment is matana, then even if the borrower defaults partially, they would still owe the full amount (kulah bo shlomi) since there's no longer an underlying debt relationship - they're simply obligated to give a gift of the full amount. The analysis extends to comparing this with other areas of halacha (הלכה), particularly the sugya of ona'ah (overcharging) where similar principles about tanai and mechila (forgiveness) apply. The Ramban (רמב"ן)'s approach distinguishes between monetary relationships that are agreements between parties (where tanai can be effective) versus ritual obligations like kiddushin where the structure is unilateral and tanai cannot modify the essential nature of the act. The shiur concludes by examining how different Rishonim resolve the practical question of why someone would lend for ten years if they understood it might result in total loss, suggesting that lenders assume responsibility to collect through permitted means like prozbul before the sabbatical year arrives.
Makkos 5a
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