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What makes an action where you perform the deed but don't want the result (psik reisha d'lo nicha lei) different from regular melacha she'ein tzricha l'gufa? Tosfos argues it should be prohibited mid'rabbanan like melacha she'ein tzricha l'gufa, while the Orach holds it's permitted as dvar she'ein miskaven. The analysis reveals a fundamental distinction between intending the act versus intending the creative purpose of the melacha.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex Tosfos on Kesubos 6a regarding the halachic status of psik reisha d'lo nicha lei (inevitable consequence that one doesn't desire). The discussion centers on a case where someone stuffs a wet cloth into a barrel opening, which will inevitably squeeze out liquid (s'chita/mefareik), though that's not the person's intent. Tosfos challenges the Orach's position that psik reisha d'lo nicha lei should be permitted as dvar she'ein miskaven (unintentional action). Instead, Tosfos argues it should be prohibited mid'rabbanan, similar to melacha she'ein tzricha l'gufa (work not needed for its essential purpose). The shiur explores the fundamental question of what distinguishes these two categories.
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Kesubos 6a
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