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Does a married Jewish woman who lives with a non-Jew become forbidden to her husband? Tosfos analyzes Rabbeinu Tam's position that non-Jews are like animals regarding forbidden relations. The key distinction: when done against her will (ones), there's no prohibition, but when voluntary (berotzon), she's considering the non-Jew equal to a Jew, making it actual forbidden relations.
This shiur examines a fundamental dispute in Tosfos regarding the status of relations between a married Jewish woman and a non-Jew. The Gemara (גמרא) states that community leaders should restrain themselves when non-Jewish authorities demand Jewish women, suggesting there's no obligation of martyrdom (yeharig v'al ya'avor). This implies it's not considered forbidden relations (gilui arayos). Rabbeinu Tam explains that a non-Jew is considered like an animal (behema) regarding forbidden relations, therefore it doesn't constitute gilui arayos and doesn't make the woman forbidden to her husband. The Rivash understands this literally - that any relations with a non-Jew never prohibit the woman to her husband. However, the Ridvaz and Rosh disagree, maintaining that while it's not gilui arayos requiring martyrdom, it still prohibits the woman to her husband when done voluntarily.
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Kesubos 3b
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