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What's the difference between confession (vidui) and repentance (teshuvah), and why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) require that God testify a person will never return to their sin? The shiur develops a profound understanding that teshuvah means breaking spiritual addiction by deciding not to decide anymore in certain areas - creating a complete separation between past and present self.
This shiur explores the fundamental distinction between confession (vidui) and repentance (teshuvah) in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Teshuvah. The Rambam presents an apparent contradiction: in discussing confession, he emphasizes first feeling sorry, then committing to change; in repentance, the order reverses - first commitment, then regret. More significantly, repentance requires that God testify the person will never return to that sin, while confession only requires a personal commitment. Rabbi Zweig resolves this by explaining that confession addresses fixing our relationship with God - apologizing for past wrongs - while repentance addresses changing ourselves internally. The key insight emerges from the Rambam's definition of a complete ba'al teshuvah: someone who finds himself in the exact same situation (same person, same place, same passion) where he previously sinned, but now refrains. This isn't about testing oneself, but about defining what repentance truly means.
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Rambam Hilchos Teshuvah chapters 1-2
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