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What does 'kavshah zakuk lah' (if it goes out, relight it) mean for Chanukah (חנוכה) candle obligations? Rashi (רש"י) holds you've fulfilled hadlakas haner even if candles die out early, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) sees extinguishing as retroactively invalidating the entire mitzvah (מצוה). This machlokes reshapes which oils are merely discouraged versus completely pasul.
This shiur analyzes a complex Talmudic discussion from Masechta Shabbos (שבת) regarding the halachos of Chanukah (חנוכה) lighting, specifically examining the principle of 'kavshah zakuk lah' (if it goes out, you must relight it). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses which oils and wicks are permissible for Chanukah candles, with particular focus on the difference between Shabbos and weekday lighting. Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the meaning of 'kavshah zakuk lah.' According to Rashi's understanding, if candles go out and one is obligated to relight them, the person fulfills the basic mitzvah (מצוה) of hadlakas haner (lighting candles) even if they walk away and the candles extinguish. The concern is only about completing the secondary requirement of pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) for the full required time. However, according to the Rambam's interpretation, 'kavshah zakuk lah' means that if the candles go out, retroactively the person has accomplished nothing - the entire mitzvah is invalidated. This leads to a fundamental disagreement about whether certain oils and wicks are merely discouraged (lechatechilah) or completely invalid (pasul). The shiur examines how this dispute affects the understanding of the Mishna's statement 'ein madlikin' (we do not light) - whether this prohibition applies equally on Shabbos and weekdays or has different applications. Rabbi Zweig also discusses how Tosafos (תוספות) addresses the question of why the Gemara mentions both Shabbos and weekday restrictions if the reasoning is the same. The analysis extends to practical applications, including the ruling of the Terumat Hadeshen regarding Erev Shabbos lighting when candles extinguish before the proper time. Throughout, the shiur demonstrates how these technical halachic discussions reflect deeper principles about the nature of mitzvah fulfillment and the relationship between intention, action, and result in Jewish law.
Shabbos 21a-21b
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