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Can the Sages prohibit or modify Torah (תורה)-mandated mitzvos? Three approaches emerge: Rabbeinu Yonah allows only indirect prevention through general prohibitions, the Ramban (רמב"ן) permits complete uprooting of mitzvos, and the Rambam (רמב"ם) allows direct prohibition. The shiur applies this to resolve the Rambam's apparent contradiction about Kriyat Shema after chatzos by distinguishing between full mitzvah (מצוה) fulfillment and mere obligation-discharge.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of a fundamental question in Jewish law: to what extent can the Sages prohibit or modify Torah (תורה)-mandated mitzvos? Three major positions are examined in detail. Rabbeinu Yonah maintains that chachamim cannot directly prohibit a Torah mitzvah (מצוה) unless they invoke a general prohibition (like muktze on Shabbos (שבת)) that applies beyond just preventing the mitzvah. They can use general halachic categories to indirectly prevent mitzvah performance, but cannot directly oppose a Torah commandment. The Ramban (רמב"ן) agrees with this limitation but offers a different solution: while chachamim cannot prohibit mitzvos directly, they possess the authority to be 'oiker' (uproot/nullify) the mitzvah entirely in certain circumstances. When they exercise this power, there simply is no mitzvah obligation. The Rambam (רמב"ם) presents the most expansive view, holding that chachamim can even directly prohibit mitzvah performance when necessary. The shiur then applies these principles to resolve contradictions in the Rambam's rulings about Kriyat Shema. The Rambam appears inconsistent when he states the mitzvah of Shema is only until chatzos (midnight) in one place, but allows fulfillment after chatzos in another. Rabbi Zweig resolves this by distinguishing between 'kiyum hamitzvah' (fulfilling the mitzvah with its full reward) and 'yotzei yedei chovaso' (discharging one's obligation to avoid being called negligent). According to this reading, the Rambam holds that after chatzos, one can still recite Shema to avoid the status of being a poshei'a (negligent person), but this does not constitute full mitzvah performance with its associated reward. This analysis extends to other time-bound mitzvos like eating korbanot, where similar distinctions between obligation-discharge and mitzvah-fulfillment apply. The shiur demonstrates how the Rambam's approach allows for rabbinic flexibility while maintaining pressure for proper mitzvah timing through reduced spiritual reward for delayed performance.
Berachos 2a
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