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Why does the Torah (תורה) emphasize that fruits and vegetables have seeds when permitting Adam to eat them? The shiur develops a yesod that our right to consume depends on our responsibility to replenish—accomplished through blessings. Making a berachah is not merely asking permission from Hashem (ה׳), but actively replacing what we take from the world, cultivating sensitivity to others and future generations.
This shiur explores the dual nature of blessings before eating, analyzing two seemingly contradictory sources in Masechta Berachos. The Gemara (גמרא) on 35b establishes that logic requires asking permission before deriving pleasure from this world, while Rav Yitzchok on 48b derives from the pasuk "u'veirach es lachmecha" that we must bless bread before eating. The Maharsha questions how Rav Yitzchok's reading aligns with the simple meaning of the verse, and Rabbi Zweig raises a deeper difficulty: if logic alone obligates blessings, why is a pasuk necessary at all? The answer emerges from analyzing creation. On the third day, Hashem (ה׳) commanded the earth to produce vegetation and fruit trees with seeds. On the sixth day, when giving Adam permission to eat, the Torah (תורה) repeats the description—fruits and vegetables with seeds. Since all fruits and vegetables naturally have seeds, this repetition seems superfluous. The shiur explains that this repetition teaches a fundamental principle: man's permission to eat is not absolute, but conditional. We may only consume that which can be replaced. The mention of seeds represents man's responsibility to ensure the world is not depleted by our consumption.
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Berachos 35b, 48b
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