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Why do we make borei pri ha'adama on vegetable soup but shehakol on fruit juice? The Rosh distinguishes between extracting taste into liquid versus juice being its own independent fruit. However, juice fails the Torah (תורה)'s ve'achalta requirement since liquids don't qualify as ma'achal (food) for brachos purposes.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of a complex halachic question regarding brachos on liquids, focusing on the Rosh's commentary in Siman 18. The central question is why we make borei pri ha'adama on soup made from vegetables, but we don't make borei pri ha'eitz on fruit juice like orange or apple juice. The Rosh initially seems to suggest that vegetable soup contains the taste of the vegetable while fruit juice doesn't contain the taste of the fruit, which appears counterintuitive since orange juice clearly tastes like oranges. Rabbi Zweig offers an innovative interpretation of the Rosh's position. According to this understanding, the Rosh is not making a claim about taste at all. Rather, he's making a fundamental distinction about the nature of the bracha itself. When making a bracha on vegetable soup, one is thanking Hashem (ה׳) for the vegetable - the bracha is on the original fruit/vegetable whose taste has been extracted into water. However, fruit juice represents an entirely different category - it is its own independent fruit produced by the tree, not merely the taste of the original fruit extracted into liquid. The Rosh connects this to his earlier discussion in Siman 3 about wine, where he explains that the requirement of 've'achalta' (eating) is necessary for brachos. The Gemara (גמרא)'s statement of 'ze ba'alma' regarding fruit juice means that while juice could theoretically warrant a borei pri ha'eitz as its own fruit, it fails to meet the Torah (תורה)'s requirement of being a ma'achal (food). Liquids don't qualify as ma'achal in the context of 've'achalta,' which is why fruit juice doesn't receive borei pri ha'eitz. The Rosh then raises a doubt about cooked fruit - if one takes a fruit and cooks it into a soup, what bracha should be made? This creates a complex analysis involving two potential issues: first, whether cooking removes the fruit's status as a pri (fruit), similar to how the Rambam (רמב"ם) rules that cooking fruit changes its normal bracha to shehakol; and second, whether the cooked fruit still maintains its ma'achal status even when cooked. The shiur explores how this connects to broader principles in hilchos brachos, including the Rambam's ruling in Hilchos Brachos 5:3 about cooked fruits, and the concept that the derech (normal way) of consumption affects bracha determination. The analysis demonstrates how the Rosh's approach differs from other Rishonim by focusing on the ma'achal requirement rather than the pri requirement for borei pri ha'eitz. This comprehensive treatment reveals the underlying principles governing brachos on processed foods and liquids, showing how the Rosh's systematic approach provides a unified framework for understanding these complex halachic determinations.
Brachos 38a
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