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Do you make brachos on harmful foods, and if so, which bracha? Rashi (רש"י) holds that Bracha Rishona follows the act of achila itself, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) bases it on hana'ah received. This machlokes reshapes how we understand mazik olive oil, mixed foods, and the fundamental relationship between Bracha Rishona and Bracha Achrona.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of a complex sugya in Masechta Brachos dealing with brachos on foods that cause harm (mazik). Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the nature of Bracha Rishona itself. According to Rashi, Bracha Rishona is based on the act of achila (eating) - following the Torah (תורה)'s directive of 'v'achalta v'savata u'veirachta.' Therefore, anything that constitutes ma'aseh achila requires a bracha, even if it's harmful. The Rambam, however, holds that Bracha Rishona is based on hana'ah (pleasure/benefit) received, not the act of eating per se. The shiur examines several practical applications: When discussing olive oil that's mazik (harmful), Rashi maintains you cannot make any bracha because there's no real achila when something harms you. The Rambam argues that if you receive hana'ah (such as relieving a sore throat - kochesh bigrono), you make a bracha on that pleasure, but it's shehakol nehiyeh bidvaro rather than borei pri ha'etz because the specific ma'achal (food) itself is harmful. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of 'uzuki mazik lei' (it harms him) is interpreted differently by each opinion. Rashi reads this as confirming that harmful stomach effects don't negate the bracha if there was hana'ah in the taste going down. The Rambam sees this as explaining why you cannot make a bracha on the specific ma'achal when its primary effect is harmful. The shiur addresses the complex case of mixing olive oil with bread (or anigron). The Gemara discusses principles of ikar and tafel (primary and secondary), but Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that this isn't the standard ikar/tafel discussion. Rather, it's addressing whether one can make a bracha on a food item that requires another food to make it edible. The Rambam's position leads to a remarkable chiddush regarding Bracha Achrona: since his understanding of Bracha Rishona is based on hana'ah rather than achila, there would be no Bracha Achrona required in cases where you only received hana'ah but didn't perform a true achila. This creates a fundamental distinction between the two types of brachos in the Rambam's system. Rabbi Zweig also addresses how this machlokes affects other areas of hilchos brachos, including potential applications to brachos on fragrances and other forms of hana'ah that aren't traditional achila. The shiur concludes by showing how this understanding resolves several difficult questions raised by the Rabbeinu Yonah and other Rishonim regarding the precise mechanics of brachos on mixed foods and harmful substances.
Brachos 35b-36a
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