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Why does drinking plain olive oil require no bracha according to most Rishonim, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) requires shehakol? The shiur develops a fundamental machlokes about whether hilchos berachos is rooted in achila (eating) or can apply independently to shtiya (drinking). This yesod explains disputes about vegetable juices and when beverages retain their original food's bracha.
The shiur analyzes Masechta Berachos 35b regarding berachos on shemen zayis (olive oil). The Mechaber rules that drinking olive oil plain requires no bracha because it's harmful (zuki mazik lei), while if mixed with vegetables for medicinal purposes (choshesh bigrono), one makes borei pri ha'etz on the oil. This creates several fundamental questions. First, there's a machlokes between the Rambam (רמב"ם) and other Rishonim: the Rambam holds that drinking oil plain still requires shehakol, while Rashi (רש"י) and others say no bracha at all due to it being harmful. This contradicts the Gemara (גמרא) in daf lamed-vav which suggests that harmful substances still require berachos if they provide hana'a (benefit). The shiur examines how each position deals with this contradiction. Second, there's a dispute between the Beis Yosef and Bahag regarding ikar v'tafel (primary and secondary foods): does the determination depend on quantity (harbeh) or purpose (choshesh bigrono)? The Tour questions the Bahag's position that medicinal use should require a bracha, when logically medicine should exempt one from berachos. Third, the Magen Avrohom challenges why vegetable juice requires shehakol rather than borei pri ha'adama, leading to a fundamental dispute with the Gra about whether the bracha depends on the food's nature or the manner of consumption. The shiur proposes that the core machlokes between Rashi and the Rambam concerns whether hilchos berachos fundamentally requires achila (eating) or can apply to shtiya (drinking) as well. According to Rashi, berachos are rooted in 'v'achalta v'savata' and require actual eating; drinking only gets a bracha when it's considered b'chlal achila (included in eating) due to the food value entering the body. According to the Rambam, shtiya itself creates its own chiyuv bracha based on hana'as shtiya (benefit from drinking). This explains why the Rambam can require a bracha on harmful oil - it's not about the food value but about the unique pleasure of drinking oil that coats a sore throat. The analysis extends to practical applications like tomato juice and the broader question of when beverages made from solid foods require their original bracha versus shehakol.
Berachos 35b
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