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What is the status of converts who underwent proper conversion procedures but had ulterior motives like money or marriage? The shiur establishes that such converts retain full Jewish status once circumcision, mikvah, and mitzvah (מצוה) acceptance occurred before three judges. Even converts with improper motivations cannot renounce their Jewish identity, just as apostates remain halakhically Jewish despite abandoning observance.
This shiur presents a detailed exposition of the laws of conversion (geirus) based primarily on Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 268 and Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Mishneh Torah (תורה), Hilchos Issurei Bi'ah chapters 13-14. Rabbi Zweig establishes three categories of converts: (1) Ideal converts who are properly investigated, informed of Torah's difficulties, yet persist out of love; (2) Converts who underwent conversion with ulterior motives (money, power, marriage) but still went through proper procedures of circumcision, mikvah, and acceptance of mitzvos before three kosher judges - these remain valid converts; (3) Converts who never intended to observe mitzvos but lied during the conversion process - their status remains uncertain but they must be treated as converts unless proven otherwise. The shiur emphasizes that even converts with ulterior motives retain full Jewish status, including marriage obligations requiring a get for divorce and liability for Shabbos (שבת) violations. The Rama adds that even born Jews who become apostates and later repent remain Jewish, though rabbis require mikvah immersion and renewed acceptance of mitzvos before three witnesses. The discussion includes the historical cases of converts in the days of Shimshon and King Shlomo, where the Rambam explains that despite improper motivations, such converts maintained Jewish status once the formal procedures were completed. Regarding the formal conversion process, the Rambam and Rif require all steps (circumcision, mikvah, and acceptance of mitzvos) to occur before three kosher judges, while the Shulchan Aruch requires this only for the acceptance of mitzvos, though preferring all steps be supervised. The shiur concludes that neither converts nor born Jews can renounce their Jewish identity - apostasy does not remove Jewish status halakhically. The session also addresses contemporary questions about Reform conversions, childhood conversions, and documentation issues, emphasizing the importance of proper Orthodox supervision and documentation for conversions to be universally accepted.
Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 268:12, Rambam Mishneh Torah Hilchos Issurei Bi'ah 13:14-18, 14:1-6
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