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Why does flour require shehakol instead of borei pri ha'adama if it comes from wheat? The shiur analyzes the fundamental machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rif on defining 'pri' - whether it means literal fruit or any produce of the land. This distinction explains when processed foods lose their original bracha status.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Gemara (גמרא) Berachos 37a, focusing on the sugya of Kimcha D'Chita (wheat flour) and the machlokes between Rav Yehuda and Rav Nachman regarding the proper bracha. Rav Yehuda holds one makes borei pri ha'adama on flour, while Rav Nachman maintains it requires shehakol. The Gemara's reasoning centers on whether flour has a 'lui achrina' (alternative use), namely being made into bread. Rabbi Zweig examines several fundamental issues raised by the Rishonim. The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch's question challenges why one cannot make borei pri ha'etz on wine, since wine is certainly a 'pri' (fruit) - if borei pri hagafen is appropriate, why not the more general borei pri ha'etz? The Ritva provides a crucial answer: even if you make an incorrect but related bracha (like borei pri ha'etz instead of borei pri hagafen), you are still yotzei because wine is indeed a fruit.
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Brachos 37a
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