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What does 'lo klum' mean in Brachos 36a, and how does it differ from shehakol? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: brachos on objects (like borei pri ha-etz) permit the item itself, while shehakol acknowledges pleasure received. This chakira resolves the Bahag's position that 'lo klum' means shehakol - the object needs no bracha, but the benefit does.
This shiur provides a deep analysis of Gemara (גמרא) Brachos 36a, focusing on a fundamental question about the nature of different types of brachos. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the dispute between Rav Sheshet (who says papalut requires shehakol) and Rav (who says lo klum - nothing). The central issue is understanding what 'lo klum' means according to the Bahag (Ba'al Halachos Gedolos), who maintains that wherever the Gemara says 'lo klum,' it actually means shehakol mi-she-bara davo. The Rashbatz raises a powerful question: if lo klum means shehakol, then Rav and Rav Sheshet aren't actually arguing - they both hold you make shehakol. This seems to contradict the clear indication in the Gemara that there is a genuine dispute between them. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that this understanding of the Bahag creates problems with multiple sugyos in the Gemara, where the simple reading suggests that 'lo klum' means no bracha at all, not shehakol.
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Brachos 36a
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