A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
What does 'lo klum' mean in Brachos 36a, and how does it differ from shehakol? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: brachos on objects (like borei pri ha-etz) permit the item itself, while shehakol acknowledges pleasure received. This chakira resolves the Bahag's position that 'lo klum' means shehakol - the object needs no bracha, but the benefit does.
This shiur provides a deep analysis of Gemara (גמרא) Brachos 36a, focusing on a fundamental question about the nature of different types of brachos. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the dispute between Rav Sheshet (who says papalut requires shehakol) and Rav (who says lo klum - nothing). The central issue is understanding what 'lo klum' means according to the Bahag (Ba'al Halachos Gedolos), who maintains that wherever the Gemara says 'lo klum,' it actually means shehakol mi-she-bara davo. The Rashbatz raises a powerful question: if lo klum means shehakol, then Rav and Rav Sheshet aren't actually arguing - they both hold you make shehakol. This seems to contradict the clear indication in the Gemara that there is a genuine dispute between them. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that this understanding of the Bahag creates problems with multiple sugyos in the Gemara, where the simple reading suggests that 'lo klum' means no bracha at all, not shehakol.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Brachos 36a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
Why does saying Ashrei three times daily guarantee a share in the World to Come? The verse 'umasbia l'chol chai ratzon' reveals that God provides not just sustenance but pleasure to all creation out of pure love. This recognition teaches us that even basic needs are expressions of divine chesed, creating the foundation for love-motivated service through both major and minor mitzvos.
Should one learn Torah full-time trusting in Divine providence, or combine learning with work? The shiur distinguishes between Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai's approach of complete separation from worldly concerns versus Rabbi Shmuel's view that proper work itself becomes part of Torah. The key insight: true emunah means learning without demanding sustenance from either Hashem or community, unlike having a 'contract' expecting payment for learning.
Should one combine Torah study with work, or rely entirely on Divine providence through exclusive learning? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, explaining that 'Bnei Aliyah' live above natural law where Torah itself becomes their reality. This connects to the difference between tzaddik gamor and tzaddik she'eino gamor regarding transcending physical limitations.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
