No community start suggestion yet.
Why do the sages both prohibit sitting with one's body in the sukkah while keeping the table outside AND nullify the mitzvah (מצוה) fulfillment? This double penalty is unprecedented among Rishonim on other mitzvos. The analysis of Tosafot and the Rambam (רמב"ם) reveals that when people have easy alternatives but might ignore rabbinic guidance for convenience, both measures are needed to give proper 'teeth' to the legislation.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of a fundamental disagreement among Rishonim regarding the rabbinic authority to prohibit Torah (תורה) commandments, focusing on the specific case of sukkah observance. The shiur begins by reviewing three major positions: Rabbeinu Yonah holds that sages cannot prohibit Torah-mandated actions except by including them under existing rabbinic prohibitions (like making lulav muktzeh on Shabbos (שבת)). The Ramban (רמב"ן) agrees in principle but requires the sages to completely nullify the mitzvah (מצוה) rather than merely prohibit it. The Rambam (רמב"ם) distinguishes between different mitzvos - by shofar he prohibits due to rabbinic decree, while by lulav he creates a specific prohibition without necessarily nullifying the mitzvah obligation. The central focus shifts to an unusual position in Tosafot regarding sukkah laws, where someone sits with their head and majority (rosho v'rubo) in the sukkah but keeps their table outside in the house. Tosafot rules this is both prohibited AND the person does not fulfill the mitzvah obligation - a double penalty that seems unprecedented among the Rishonim. This creates a fundamental question: why would the sages both prohibit an action AND nullify the mitzvah fulfillment, rather than employing just one of these measures?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Sukkah 2a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
Why does saying Ashrei three times daily guarantee a share in the World to Come? The verse 'umasbia l'chol chai ratzon' reveals that God provides not just sustenance but pleasure to all creation out of pure love. This recognition teaches us that even basic needs are expressions of divine chesed, creating the foundation for love-motivated service through both major and minor mitzvos.
Should one learn Torah full-time trusting in Divine providence, or combine learning with work? The shiur distinguishes between Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai's approach of complete separation from worldly concerns versus Rabbi Shmuel's view that proper work itself becomes part of Torah. The key insight: true emunah means learning without demanding sustenance from either Hashem or community, unlike having a 'contract' expecting payment for learning.
Should one combine Torah study with work, or rely entirely on Divine providence through exclusive learning? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, explaining that 'Bnei Aliyah' live above natural law where Torah itself becomes their reality. This connects to the difference between tzaddik gamor and tzaddik she'eino gamor regarding transcending physical limitations.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
