A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why does Brachos 35a seem to give redundant advice about consulting a scholar to learn proper blessings? The shiur develops a yesod distinguishing two separate prohibitions: brachos rishonos prevent me'ilah by seeking permission before benefiting, while brachos achronos fulfill the thanksgiving obligation after enjoying Hashem (ה׳)'s world. This resolves Rabbi Akiva Eiger's question about why safek brachos achronos are treated stringently.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Gemara (גמרא) Brachos 35a, examining the foundational principle of 'asur le'adam she'yehane min ha'olam hazeh belo bracha' (it is forbidden for a person to benefit from this world without a blessing). Rabbi Zweig begins by questioning apparent redundancies in the Talmudic text and the seemingly obvious advice to consult a scholar to learn blessings. Through careful textual analysis, he develops a sophisticated understanding that distinguishes between two separate prohibitions inherent in the act of eating without proper blessings. The first prohibition relates to having pleasure (hana'ah) without acknowledging its divine source through thanksgiving (hoda'ah), which is addressed by brachos achronos. The second prohibition involves depleting worldly resources for personal benefit without permission, constituting a form of me'ilah (misappropriation), which is prevented by brachos rishonos. This dual structure explains why going to a scholar after the fact can only address the thanksgiving requirement but cannot retroactively fix the me'ilah violation. Rabbi Zweig supports this interpretation by citing Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary and resolving apparent contradictions in the Kesef Mishneh's explanations. He addresses the famous question raised by Rabbi Akiva Eiger regarding why safek brachos achronos should be treated stringently when the general principle is that doubtful blessings should be treated leniently. The answer lies in understanding that brachos achronos address an actual prohibition against having pleasure without acknowledgment, not merely a positive commandment. The shiur concludes by explaining how this understanding resolves various halachic disputes and provides clarity on the fundamental nature of blessings as both permission-seeking (brachos rishonos) and thanksgiving (brachos achronos).
Brachos 35a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
Why does saying Ashrei three times daily guarantee a share in the World to Come? The verse 'umasbia l'chol chai ratzon' reveals that God provides not just sustenance but pleasure to all creation out of pure love. This recognition teaches us that even basic needs are expressions of divine chesed, creating the foundation for love-motivated service through both major and minor mitzvos.
Should one learn Torah full-time trusting in Divine providence, or combine learning with work? The shiur distinguishes between Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai's approach of complete separation from worldly concerns versus Rabbi Shmuel's view that proper work itself becomes part of Torah. The key insight: true emunah means learning without demanding sustenance from either Hashem or community, unlike having a 'contract' expecting payment for learning.
Should one combine Torah study with work, or rely entirely on Divine providence through exclusive learning? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, explaining that 'Bnei Aliyah' live above natural law where Torah itself becomes their reality. This connects to the difference between tzaddik gamor and tzaddik she'eino gamor regarding transcending physical limitations.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
