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Why does mixing rice with other ingredients completely negate the mezonos blessing, seemingly violating the principle of ikar v'tafel? The Geonim distinguish between tavshil (cooked dishes) and pas (bread), arguing the Gemara (גמרא) only permits mezonos on rice bread when kovea seudah. The shiur develops a chiddush that kovea seudah means satisfying initial hunger to properly enjoy a meal, not merely filling up.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of a complex sugya in Brachos 36b dealing with the halachos of brachos on orez v'dochen (rice and millet). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a fundamental dispute between Rav & Shmuel, who initially held that only the five grains (chameshes minim) warrant a borei minei mezonos blessing, while rice and millet receive shehakol even when mixed with other ingredients. The Gemara then presents the position of Rav Kahana, who argues that even when there is a majority (rov) of honey mixed with the five grains, one still recites borei minei mezonos. This leads Rav Yosef to rule that we should follow Rav Kahana's opinion over that of Rav & Shmuel. Rabbi Zweig explores several major halachic difficulties arising from this discussion. First, he examines the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position (as understood by the Beis Yosef, Bach, and Taz) that any mixture (taruvus) with rice and millet negates the borei minei mezonos blessing entirely. This seems to contradict the principle of ikar v'tafel (primary and secondary components), where a small amount of honey should not affect the bracha on the primary ingredient. The Magen Avrohom strongly objects to this position, arguing that ikar v'tafel should still apply. Rabbi Zweig also discusses Tosafos (תוספות)'s puzzling distinction that the Gemara only refuted Rav & Shmuel regarding orez (rice) but not dochen (millet), which seems inconsistent since both should follow the same halachic principles. The shiur then examines an alternative approach taken by the Geonim (Rav Hai Gaon, Rav Yehuda Gaon, and the Bahag), who distinguish between two separate halachos: one governing cooked dishes (tavshil) and another governing bread (pas). According to this view, the Gemara only refuted Rav & Shmuel regarding bread made from rice and millet when one establishes a meal (kovea seudah) with it, but not regarding tavshil. Rabbi Zweig provides an innovative explanation of kovea seudah, suggesting it refers to food that satisfies initial hunger sufficiently to allow one to enjoy the meal properly, rather than merely eating to fill up. He uses the analogy of restaurants providing bread to enhance the dining experience. This understanding helps resolve why tavshil (which includes water and thus requires larger quantities to satisfy) doesn't have the same status as bread for establishing a meal. The shiur concludes by noting that while this approach of the Geonim provides a straightforward reading of the Gemara text, the accepted halacha (הלכה) (as codified in Shulchan Aruch) rules that we do make borei minei mezonos on tavshil of rice and millet, creating the halachic difficulties mentioned earlier that will require further resolution.
Brachos 36b
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