A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When does crumbled and cooked bread (chavitsa) retain hamotzi status versus becoming mezonos? The shiur resolves the Rashi (רש"י)-Tosfos dispute by distinguishing between changing bread's essential nature versus changing its function - pieces larger than a kezayis remain substantial enough for meal establishment, while smaller pieces become snack-like.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Masechta Brachos 37a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of chavitsa - bread that has been crumbled and cooked. The central question is when such modified bread retains its status for hamotzi or becomes mezonos based on the size of the pieces. The Gemara states that if the pieces are larger than a kezayis, one makes hamotzi; if smaller, one makes mezonos. Rav Yosef brings a proof from the korban mincha to support this position. The shiur extensively examines the fundamental disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos regarding the nature of chavitsa. According to Tosfos's understanding of Rashi, chavitsa involves cooked bread, and Rav Yosef is explaining the earlier braisa about prutas kayamos - when cooked bread retains or loses its bread status. However, this interpretation faces numerous difficulties: the language of prutas kayamos doesn't clearly indicate size distinctions, Rashi elsewhere describes similar processes as baking rather than cooking, and the comparison to mincha becomes problematic since mincha isn't cooked in the same way. The shiur presents an alternative understanding of Rashi, suggesting that the issue isn't about changing the essential nature (tzura) of bread through cooking, but rather about changing its function - from something one would establish a meal upon to something that serves as a snack. Under this interpretation, if the pieces remain larger than a kezayis, the chavitsa retains enough bread-like character that people would still establish a meal upon it. If the pieces are smaller, it becomes more snack-like and warrants only mezonos. This approach resolves many of the textual difficulties while maintaining consistency with Rashi's broader halachic framework. The shiur also explores the parallel case of korban mincha, where the Torah (תורה) commands pesisa (breaking into pieces), analyzing whether this breaking is merely functional (to enable kemitza) or represents an essential part of creating the offering. The discussion includes practical applications, noting that according to this understanding, modern items like bagel chips might require only mezonos rather than hamotzi, though contemporary halachic practice may differ from this theoretical analysis.
Brachos 37a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
Why does saying Ashrei three times daily guarantee a share in the World to Come? The verse 'umasbia l'chol chai ratzon' reveals that God provides not just sustenance but pleasure to all creation out of pure love. This recognition teaches us that even basic needs are expressions of divine chesed, creating the foundation for love-motivated service through both major and minor mitzvos.
Should one learn Torah full-time trusting in Divine providence, or combine learning with work? The shiur distinguishes between Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai's approach of complete separation from worldly concerns versus Rabbi Shmuel's view that proper work itself becomes part of Torah. The key insight: true emunah means learning without demanding sustenance from either Hashem or community, unlike having a 'contract' expecting payment for learning.
Should one combine Torah study with work, or rely entirely on Divine providence through exclusive learning? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, explaining that 'Bnei Aliyah' live above natural law where Torah itself becomes their reality. This connects to the difference between tzaddik gamor and tzaddik she'eino gamor regarding transcending physical limitations.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
