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Why does Brachos 35a emphasize that failing to make a bracha constitutes me'ilah, and why do Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) focus on bracha acharona rather than bracha rishona? The shiur develops a dual understanding: brachos both build relationship with Hashem (ה׳) and ensure replacement of consumed resources. This reframes me'ilah as stealing from both our Divine relationship and the community's future abundance.
The shiur analyzes Gemara (גמרא) Brachos 35a's statement that "a person is forbidden to derive benefit from this world without a blessing, and whoever derives benefit from this world without a blessing commits me'ilah." Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות), who both understand the prohibition as primarily referring to bracha acharona (blessings after eating), not bracha rishona (blessings before eating). This creates a fundamental question about why the Gemara focuses on the concluding blessing rather than the opening one. The analysis reveals two distinct aspects of brachos that address this apparent contradiction. First, there is the relationship aspect - brachos are not primarily about seeking permission from an owner, but about building a relationship with Hashem (ה׳) who wants to share pleasure with us. When God provides food, He's offering an opportunity for relationship. Making a bracha acknowledges this gift and maintains the connection, while failing to make a bracha represents a rejection of this relationship - which constitutes the me'ilah.
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Brachos 35a
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