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Why can't we blow shofar or take lulav on Shabbos (שבת) when Torah (תורה) obligates these mitzvos? Three major approaches emerge: Rabbeinu Yonah says Chachamim can only create general prohibitions that conflict with Torah obligations, the Ramban (רמב"ן) allows uprooting Torah obligations entirely ('la'akor'), and the Rambam (רמב"ם) permits direct counter-prohibitions. This machloket has practical ramifications for muktzeh status of ritual objects.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of a fundamental machloket among Rishonim regarding the authority of the Chachamim to override Torah (תורה) obligations, emerging from the question of why one cannot fulfill mitzvos like Shema, Shofar, and Lulav after certain times or on Shabbos (שבת). Rabbeinu Yonah maintains that the Chachamim can never directly tell someone not to perform a Torah mitzvah (מצוה). When they appear to do so, it's actually because they established a general rabbinic prohibition that happens to conflict with the Torah obligation. For example, with Shofar on Shabbos, there's a general prohibition against blowing Shofar every Shabbos due to shvus, and normally this would be overridden (docheh) by the Torah obligation on Rosh Hashanah. However, due to Rabba's concern of 'shema ya'avi'renu b'yado' (lest one carry it), the Chachamim maintained their general prohibition even when it conflicts with the Torah mitzvah.
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Berachos 2a
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