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Why does the Torah (תורה) say "when a man sells his daughter as an amah" without specifying to whom? The sale of an amah ivris creates a status—a challas amah—rather than transferring ownership. This explains why she exits with simanim (puberty signs) even when the master's contractual term hasn't ended, and why the kal v'chomer for misas ha'av (father's death) specifically uses simanim rather than shesh (six years).
Rabbi Zweig analyzes the formulation of the pasuk "ki yimkor ish es bito l'amah" (when a man sells his daughter as an amah), which notably omits specifying to whom the daughter is sold. This seemingly incomplete formulation points to a fundamental conceptual distinction between the sale of an amah ivris and ordinary ownership transfer. The shiur develops a foundational yesod: the sale of an amah ivris does not constitute a transfer of the father's ownership rights to the master. Instead, the act of sale itself creates a new status—it places a challas amah (the status of being an amah) upon the daughter. The father is not selling his ownership of his daughter's labor to another party; rather, he is exercising his authority to change her halachic status to that of an amah ivris. This is parallel to marriage (kiddushin), where the father can marry off his daughter even beyond the age when his direct ownership ends (age 12.5), because marriage is not a transfer of ownership but the creation of a new status (challas eishes ish).
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Kiddushin 14b-18a (laws of amah ivris)
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