A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When may one interrupt Krias Shema for matters like honoring parents or life-threatening situations? The shiur develops three approaches: the Rosh views respectful greetings as expansions of accepting God's sovereignty rather than true interruptions, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rashi (רש"י) debate whether one completely stops and resumes versus genuinely interrupts the mitzvah (מצוה).
This shiur analyzes the complex sugya of mafsik b'Krias Shema (interrupting during the Shema) found on daf 13a of Masechta Berachos. The discussion centers on the Mishna's ruling about when one may interrupt the recitation of Shema, particularly for matters of pikuach nefesh (life-threatening situations) or kibbud av v'em (honoring parents). Rabbi Zweig presents three fundamental approaches to understanding this halacha (הלכה). Rashi (רש"י)'s position is that the heter (permission) to interrupt is based on pikuach nefesh - one may stop reciting Shema to save his life when threatened by a king or official. The Rosh challenges this, asking "ein lo dover she'omed bifnei pikuach nefesh" - this situation doesn't constitute true pikuach nefesh, making Rashi's explanation difficult. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach differs significantly, using the language "posek umazkir v'shoel" - he stops, greets, and responds. This suggests that Krias Shema is actually concluded, not merely interrupted. The shiur explores the fundamental machloket about whether these interruptions constitute: 1) An expansion of Kabbalas Ol Malchus Shamayim (according to the Rosh) - greeting parents and showing respect are themselves expressions of accepting God's sovereignty, making them part of an "expanded" version of Shema rather than true interruptions; 2) A complete cessation of Krias Shema (according to the Rambam) - the mitzvah (מצוה) ends, one performs other actions, then continues reading without needing to restart; 3) A genuine interruption for pikuach nefesh (according to Rashi) - a special dispensation that doesn't require restarting the entire recitation. The analysis includes practical nafka minas (halachic differences), such as whether one may interrupt for kedusha or borchu, and whether interruptions in Hebrew (lashon hakodesh) are more or less problematic than in other languages. The shiur also addresses the question of why one doesn't need to repeat the bracha after such interruptions, exploring whether birkas Krias Shema functions as a birkas hamitzvah or has a different status entirely.
Berachos 13a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
Why does saying Ashrei three times daily guarantee a share in the World to Come? The verse 'umasbia l'chol chai ratzon' reveals that God provides not just sustenance but pleasure to all creation out of pure love. This recognition teaches us that even basic needs are expressions of divine chesed, creating the foundation for love-motivated service through both major and minor mitzvos.
Should one learn Torah full-time trusting in Divine providence, or combine learning with work? The shiur distinguishes between Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai's approach of complete separation from worldly concerns versus Rabbi Shmuel's view that proper work itself becomes part of Torah. The key insight: true emunah means learning without demanding sustenance from either Hashem or community, unlike having a 'contract' expecting payment for learning.
Should one combine Torah study with work, or rely entirely on Divine providence through exclusive learning? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, explaining that 'Bnei Aliyah' live above natural law where Torah itself becomes their reality. This connects to the difference between tzaddik gamor and tzaddik she'eino gamor regarding transcending physical limitations.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
