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Why does the Torah (תורה) repeat the law of "an eye for an eye" in both Mishpatim and Emor? Rabbi Zweig develops two distinct theories underlying capital punishment. One: striking a Jew is striking the Shechina itself—an attack on God. Two: taking a life forfeits one's own right to exist. The difference between Jewish and Noahide law reflects whether execution protects society or safeguards individual rights.
Rabbi Zweig opens by contrasting the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Ramban (רמב"ן) on the scope of the Noahide commandment of Dinim. The Rambam holds that Bnei Noach must establish a judiciary to enforce the other six Noahide laws. The Ramban expands this dramatically: Dinim includes establishing a legislative body and a comprehensive system of social justice mirroring Parshas Mishpatim—laws of bailment, torts, oaths, and more. The Rama in his responsa challenges the Ramban with a proof from Gemara (גמרא) Sanhedrin: at Marah, before Matan Torah (תורה), the Jewish people received the seven Noahide laws plus three new elements in the category of Dinim—requiring a court of twenty-three judges (Eidah), two witnesses (Eidim), and prior warning (Hasra'ah). If Dinim already encompassed all of Mishpatim's civil law under Noahide obligations, why did the Gemara need to search for what was added? It could have cited any law from Mishpatim. The Rama concludes this proves Dinim under Noahide law means only establishing courts to enforce the seven laws, not the broader corpus the Ramban suggests. Rabbi Zweig then raises a textual puzzle: why does the Torah repeat "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" in both Shemos 21:23–25 (Parshas Mishpatim) and Vayikra 24:19–20 (Parshas Emor)? Moreover, the law of capital murder—"one who strikes a man and he dies shall surely die"—appears in Shemos 21:12 and again in Vayikra 24:17. Rashi (רש"י) on Shemos 21:12 notes that the verse in Vayikra ("if a man strikes any soul") would imply execution even if the victim did not die; therefore the verse in Shemos adds "and he dies" to teach that death of the victim is required. Conversely, the verse in Shemos uses the word "ish" (man), which might exclude a woman or minor as victim; the verse in Vayikra uses "kol nefesh" (any soul) to include them. Rashi continues: if we had only Shemos's verse, we might think even a minor perpetrator is liable; Vayikra specifies "ish ki yaka"—a man who strikes—excluding minors. And if we had only Vayikra, we might include even a nefel (a non-viable newborn); Shemos's "ish" excludes that. A Mechilta adds that "kol nefesh" might include even an embryo (uber); the word "ish" in Shemos teaches otherwise. Each verse is incomplete and seemingly misleading without the other. Why would the Torah write two verses, neither of which states the law correctly on its own?
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Parshas Mishpatim (Shemot 21:12-25) and Parshas Emor (Vayikra 24:10-20)
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