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Can rabbis completely uproot Torah (תורה) obligations, or do they merely prohibit performance while the mitzvah (מצוה) remains intact? The shiur analyzes the Rashba's treatment of bal tosif regarding shofar to prove that rabbinic authority stops short of full uprooting. This supports Rabbeinu Yonah's position that one still fulfills mitzvos even when performed against rabbinic directive.
This shiur explores fundamental questions about the scope of rabbinic authority through analysis of Brachos 2a and related sources. Rabbi Zweig examines two approaches to understanding yesh koach l'chachamim la'akor davar min haTorah - the power of sages to uproot matters from the Torah (תורה). The first approach, associated with the Ramban (רמב"ן), holds that the rabbis can actually uproot (oiker) the obligation of a mitzvah (מצוה) entirely, meaning there is no mitzvah and no fulfillment if performed. The second approach, championed by Rabbeinu Yonah, maintains that the rabbis merely prohibit the performance while the mitzvah obligation remains intact. Rabbi Zweig brings a crucial proof from the Rashba in Rosh Hashanah 27a regarding shofar blowing. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses blowing shofar both before and during the Shemoneh Esrei, with Tosafos (תוספות) questioning whether additional blowing constitutes bal tosif (adding to Torah commands). The Rashba responds that when sages command or forbid an action, there is no violation of bal tosif or bal tigra because one acts in fulfillment of the rabbinic directive rather than from personal intention to add or subtract from Torah law. The Tur argues against this proof, noting a fundamental distinction: regarding shofar on Shabbos (שבת) (the prohibition case), one violates bal tigra through passive non-performance, while bal tosif involves active commission. How can these serve as comparable proofs? Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that the Rashba's position only makes sense if he rejects the Ramban's approach. If the rabbis could completely uproot mitzvah obligations, then not blowing shofar on Shabbos wouldn't constitute bal tigra at all - there would simply be no obligation. The fact that the Rashba treats it as bal tigra proves he holds the mitzvah obligation remains while the rabbis merely prohibit performance. This analysis extends to practical applications in hilchos Krias Shema and korban laws. Rabbi Zweig explores how this dispute affects the status of one who performs the mitzvah despite rabbinic prohibition, citing Rav Akiva Eiger's position that one still fulfills the mitzvah even when acting against rabbinic directive. The shiur concludes by examining a complex passage in Tosefta regarding when korban meat becomes nosar (leftover), using this to further illuminate whether rabbinic restrictions constitute complete nullification of mitzvah obligations or merely prohibited performance of valid mitzvos.
Brachos 2a
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