No community start suggestion yet.
Why does the Torah (תורה) present two different formulations of murder laws that seem to require correction? The shiur distinguishes between social justice laws (Mishpatim) based on proportional restitution and divine image laws (Emor) that treat attacking another person as an assault on God's tzelem Elokim. This framework reshapes contemporary issues from abortion to medical ethics.
This shiur examines the apparent contradictions in the Torah (תורה)'s laws regarding murder, specifically analyzing the verses "Ish ki yaka kol nefesh" (Vayikra/Emor) and "Maka ish vameis mos yumus" (Mishpatim). Rabbi Zweig presents a fundamental question: why does the Torah present two seemingly incorrect formulations that require correction from other verses? The shiur develops a comprehensive theory distinguishing between two entirely different approaches to interpersonal laws (bein adam l'chavero). The first approach, found in Parshas Mishpatim, is based on social justice and restitution - "ayin tachas ayin" (eye for an eye). Under this system, capital punishment requires that the perpetrator be an adult (ish) and the victim must actually die, as these conditions are necessary for proportional justice. The second approach, found in Parshas Emor, is based on the concept that attacking another person constitutes an attack on the divine image (tzelem Elokim) within them. The shiur traces this concept back to Cain and Abel, reinterpreting that story to show that Cain's murder of Abel was actually an attack against God, expressing his anger at divine rejection by striking God's representative. This framework explains why Parshas Emor uses the language of "mum" (blemish) - terminology reserved for holy objects - when describing injuries between people. Under the tzelem Elokim approach, even striking without killing, or striking a minor, could warrant severe punishment because it represents an attack on the divine presence. The shiur applies this dual framework to contemporary issues, particularly abortion. The analysis suggests that abortion cannot be justified merely as "my body, my choice" because even our own bodies contain elements of divine image that we hold in trust rather than own absolutely. This same principle explains the prohibition against suicide. Rabbi Zweig emphasizes that developing sensitivity to the tzelem Elokim in ourselves and others requires actively performing acts of chesed (חסד) (kindness) that mirror divine attributes - "mah hu chanun, af atah chanun" (just as He is gracious, so should you be gracious). These actions cultivate our awareness of the divine element within us, which then enables us to recognize and respect it in others. The shiur concludes with practical applications to medical ethics, cosmetic surgery, and the fundamental approach to interpersonal relationships, emphasizing that viewing others as bearers of divine image creates higher standards than mere social contracts based on mutual tolerance.
Vayikra 24:17, Shemos 21:12
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Halacha
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Up Next in this Series
How was Yitzchok comforted after Sarah's death through marrying Rivka? The Hebrew 'vayinachem' means both comfort and change of direction, revealing that healing comes through shifting focus outward. Depression and mourning are self-absorbed states; true comfort emerges when we channel our pain into caring for others.
How could Avrohom keep the entire Torah before it was given, including rabbinical laws? The key insight is that mitzvos represent eternal spiritual realities, not just historical commemorations, so Avrohom could access these truths through his genuine search. His entire 172-year journey—even his early idolatry—retroactively became service of God once he reached ultimate truth.
Why does the Gemara say Avrohom knew God from age three while the Rambam says forty, after describing his idolatrous past? The principle that baalei teshuvah transform past sins into merits explains how Avrohom's early struggles became retroactive mitzvos once he used that experience to reach other idol worshippers. Unlike Shem and Ever who lacked such background, Avrohom's difficult past became his greatest qualification for helping others.
Can korbanos be brought when the Beis Hamikdash is destroyed? The Rambam and Raavad debate whether "Hashem es Mikdasham" creates a din of Avoda during Churban. Rabbi Zweig develops a distinction: the Rambam holds kedusha Rishona enabled both korbanos and tefillah; the Raavad holds only tefillah remains when the edifice is gone, since Hashem's presence endures even without a physical structure.
Why don't the last eight verses of the Torah require a minyan to read? The shiur develops a fundamental chiddush in the Rambam: Simchas Torah has two distinct takanos of Kriat HaTorah — Zot HaBracha is read from the din of Yom Tov (inyan hayom), while VaYom Moshe is read from the din of Shabbos (siyum haTorah). This explains why a new minyan is required for the last eight verses, and why the Raavad's minhag of having the oleh read (not the baal koreh) signals that the final aliyah is purely Talmud Torah, not shemiat dvar Hashem.
Why does the Rambam rule that one may not violate even a shvus (rabbinic prohibition) on Yom Tov to obtain a shofar, yet permit shofar blowing on Shabbos Rosh Hashanah despite the gezeirah of carrying it to an expert? The Lechem Mishneh wrestles with an apparent contradiction: in Hilchos Shofar 1:4 the Rambam treats shvus like a full lav vis-à-vis the mitzvah of shofar, but in 2:6 he allows shofar on Shabbos even though it involves overriding both a lav and an asei.
When is a melacha on Yom Tov permitted? The shiur develops the Rambam's three-tiered framework distinguishing melachos that are food preparation itself (always permitted), food processing (permitted only l'tzorech achilah), and non-food melachos (always forbidden). The Magid Mishneh's explanation of "ho'il" emerges: intention cannot create a melacha where the act itself is inherently permitted.
