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Why is Adam HaMazik liable even when acting as an ones (unavoidable accident)? The shiur develops the chiddush that there are two separate dinim in Adam HaMazik: liability for choosing to act (volitional decision), and liability because your body caused damage. The Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchos Chovel U'Mazik structures these two dinim across different perakim, yielding major nafka minos regarding when shibud nechasim takes effect and how to calculate payment.
Rabbi Zweig opens by reviewing several difficult passages in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s Hilchos Chovel U'Mazik. In Perek Alef, Halacha (הלכה) Alef, the Rambam states that one who injures another is liable to pay five types of damages from meitav (best-quality property). Later, in Perek Alef, Halacha Yud Alef, the Rambam repeats that Adam is liable bein shogeg, bein meizid (whether unintentional or intentional), and that one pays from meitav. Why does the Rambam repeat the din of meitav? Additionally, why does the Rambam introduce the concept of mazik mamon chaveiro (damaging another's property) in Perek Alef when he will discuss it at length in Perek Vav? And why does the Rambam in Perek Alef say liability applies only "bein shogeg u'meizid" when in Perek Vav he explicitly rules that even ones (unavoidable accident) creates liability for damaging property? Rabbi Zweig proposes a fundamental chakira (analytical distinction) in the nature of Adam HaMazik. He suggests there are actually two separate dinim underlying Adam HaMazik liability. The first din is that a person is liable because he made a volitional decision to act—he chose to move his hand, chose to initiate the action. This is liability based on the ma'aseh (action) itself. The second din is that a person is liable simply because his body caused damage to another—regardless of choice or volition, the fact that his guf (body) was the instrument of damage creates liability. This second din operates more like the liability of one's property (mamon hamazik), where there is no requirement of intent or decision.
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Bava Kamma 3b
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